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THE IDENTICAL TREATMENT OF OBSCENE AND
INDECENT SPEECH: THE 1991 NEA
APPROPRIATIONS ACT
STEPHEN N. SHER*
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right
to say it."'
"De gustibus non est disputandum. Just as there is no use arguing
about taste, there is no use litigating about it."
2
INTRODUCTION
As a result of 1980s conservatism, fundamentalist 3 groups have
recently sprung up across the country, which advocate a back-to-the-
church or back-to-the-family approach to life.4 These organizations
consider themselves the exclusive dictators of moral righteousness. In
their effort to rid society of "immorally harmful" items, such as racy
rap groups 5 and revealing bathing suits, 6 they have facilitated
* I would like to thank Professor Cheryl I. Harris, for without her this Note never would
have been possible.
1. S. G. TALLENTRYE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907), quoted in Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (called "Voltaire's immortal comment"); see also E-Bru,
Inc., v. Graves, 566 F. Supp. 1476 (D.N.J. 1983). While ruling on a zoning requirement, Judge
Sarokin elaborated on Voltaire's statement:
Voltaire did not write: 'I disapprove of what you say, but will defend your right to say it,
unless the subject is sex.' Nor did the framers of the United States Constitution .... We
will tolerate without a murmur a movie showing the most brutal murder, but display a
couple in the act of love and the outcry is deafening. This is not meant to be a defense of
the sleazy movies and adult bookstores which pander to the bizarre and the deviant, but it
is a plea for perspective in deciding whether such materials genuinely warrant an intrusion
into the rights guaranteed by the first amendment.
Id. at 1477-78.
2. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
3. Fundamentalist has been defined as, "a movement in 20th century Protestantism emphasiz-
ing the literally interpreted Bible as fundamental to Christian life and teaching." THE NEW
BRITANNICA/WEBSTER DICTIONARY & REFERENCE GUIDE 364 (1981). However, for purposes of
this article a fundamentalist is one who denounces anything they do not understand under the guise
of God and family. These fundamentalists have frequented history many times, for example in the
arrest of John Scopes, as well as in the banning of books such as Native Son by Richard Wright and
Twain's masterpiece, Huckleberry Finn.
4. Renee Graham, Morality's Defenders or Freedom's Enemies?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6,
1990, at 13. One re-occurring explanation for the religious insurrection is that now that the cold war
is over and the right wing has lost their communist "bogeyman," they need a new issue with which
to gather campaign dollars. 136 CONG. REC. H9,408 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Downey); 136 CONG. REC. H9,411 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
5. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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forces 7 that have resulted in religious8 and sexua 9 censorship. In 1989,
several of these groups joined forces to protest the display of the contro-
versial' ° photographs taken by the late Robert Mapplethorpe."
6. A law prohibiting tong bathing suits in Florida was passed under their Indecent Exposure
statute. FLA. STAT. § 847.001.
7. These fundamentalist groups are typically better organized than the "silent majority."
They write letters, make phone calls and lobby to make their views known. However, according to
Nancy Sutton, chairman of the Citizens for Family First, "[m]ost of the battles that are won are won
in prayer long before we go into the public arena." Graham, supra note 4, at 13.
8. See, e.g., Greb v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 565 A.2d 824 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (a complaint
was filed which attempted to bar the movie "The Last Temptation of Christ" from being shown),
appeal denied, 575 A.2d 566 (Pa. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 143 (1990).
9. A chain of convenient stores, 7-Eleven, stopped selling certain magazines (Playboy and
Penthouse) for fear of being "blacklisted." See Playboy Enterprises v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581, 584
(D.D.C. 1986). For a discussion of recent controversial works which have been grouped as sexual,
religious, and political, see Siobahn M. Murphy, A First Amendment Analysis of Government
Funding for the Arts (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Chicago-Kent L. Rev.).
10. The Mapplethorpe and Serrano exhibits contained everything needed for a controversy: the
religious aspect of a crucifix in a cup of urine, the sexual demeanor of the homoerotic photographs,
the general detest of wasted tax dollars, all at a time of conservatism in the United States.
11. See, e.g., Barbara Gamarekian, Corcoran, to Foil Dispute, Drops Mapplethorpe Show, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1989, at C22; Elizabeth Kastor, Corcoran Decision Provokes Outcry, WASH. POST,
June 14, 1989, at BI; Alan Parachini, Endowment, Congressmen Feud Over Provocative Art, L.A.
TIMES, June 14, 1989, Part 6, at 1; Rorie Sherman, Calm Presence in the Middle of the Art Battle,
The NAT'L L.J., July 2, 1990, at 8. Mapplethorpe was born in 1946 and brought up with a "subur-
ban" Catholic upbringing in Floral Park, Queens. Karin Lipson, Celebration and Crisis; Photogra-
pher Robert Mapplethorpe Wins Recognition From the Mainstream as He Fights for His Life,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 1, 1988, part II, at 4. According to Ingrid Sischy, while walking through Times
Square, in the late 1960s he noticed the intense sensations brought forth by the skin magazines and
wanted to transfer these sensations to the domain of his photography. Id. He said, "I thought if I
could somehow bring that element into art, if I could somehow retain that feeling, I would be doing
something that was uniquely my own." Id. In the early 1970s he studied at the Pratt Institute in
Brooklyn, but got most of his support and motivation from Patti Smith, the avant-garde rock and
roll star, and Sam Wagstaff, curator and collector. Id. Two art dealers, Holly Solomon and Leo
Castelli first displayed his work, in 1977, after he left the Pratt Institute. This early work was
mostly documentary photographs of New York's S & M scene. Id. As Mapplethorpe said, "[the S
& M photographs] end[ed] up documenting a certain thing that was going on in New York at a
certain moment .... It was an exploration of extremities-sexual extremities." Id. Since the 1970s
he began to attract serious national attention for his refined portraits of art celebrities, friends, and
the portrait-like images of flowers. Andy Grundberg, The Allure of Mapplethorpe's Photographs,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1988, § 2, at 29. The elite of the art world almost immediately accepted him in
the same group with photographers Cindy Sherman and Joel-Peter Witkin. Theodore F. Wolff,
Mapplethorpe: Fusing Originality With Classicism, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1988, § Arts
and Leisure, at 19. By the early 1980s he was universally regarded as one of America's most original
photographers. Id. He held successful museum exhibits in Paris, Amsterdam, London. Id. A book
containing a collection of his photographs was highly acclaimed and he was called the "greatest
photographer in America," Roger Lewis, My Book of the Year, Nov. 26, 1988, FIN. TIMES, § Week-
end, at XX, and "today's most famous photographer," Douglas Balz, Pictures Perfect, A Bountiful
Harvest of Photography Books, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1988, § C, at 5. His most successful exhibit was
at the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York City. See, e.g., Roberta Smith, It May Be
Good But Is It Art?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1988, § 2, at 1. One critic stated, "In a way, the most old-
fashioned of today's successful young photographers is Robert Mapplethorpe, whose style has veered
from half-hearted conceptualism toward highly charged fashion photography. His work is classi-
cally beautiful, like Edward Weston's, but unabashedly decorative." Richard B. Woodward, It's Art
but is it Photography, Oct. 9, 1988, N.Y. TIMES, § 6, at 29. Mapplethorpe died in 1986 at the age of
42.
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The Mapplethorpe exhibit was funded by the National Endowment
for the Arts ("NEA"). The NEA is an organization that grants artists
federal funds to subsidize some or all of the costs associated with the
production of art. 12 Although the NEA has come under fire several
times for funding risque art,13 in 1990 special-interest group pressure di-
rected at Congress had the NEA fighting for its very existence. 14 Yet, in
a hastily passed'5 bill, Congress approved legislation to extend funding
for the NEA for another three years. 16 However, in order to accommo-
date the right wing fundamentalists, 17 Congress included in the bill a
requirement that the head of the NEA must ensure grants are made only
after "taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect
for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" ("decency re-
quirement").' 8 The bill also stipulates that the NEA can recoup funds
from grant recipients who have created works which a court later deter-
mines to be obscene ("repayment requirement"). 19
Since the passage of the bill, nine of the eleven members of the NEA
literary panel resigned after "question[ing] the constitutionality of the
[restrictive] language." '20 Other NEA members have also confessed con-
fusion over the definition of decency, and protested by refusing to enforce
12. National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, 79 Stat.
845 (codified in 20 U.S.C. § 951(1) (1976)).
13. See generally, 136 CONG. REC. S17,990 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement by Sen. Helms).
In 1969, the NEA was criticized for giving a $1,000 grant for the creation of a one word poem
"Lighght". In 1971, an avant-garde group called the Living Stage had public school children per-
form obscenities as part of a performance. The NEA came under fire again in 1973 after it gave
funds to Erica Jong to write a book called "Fear of Flying," which recounted her sexual experience
with a German Shepard; see also MICHAEL STRAIGHT, NANCY HANKS 328-33 (1988). In 1977,
William Proxmire gave the NEA the Golden Fleece Award for paying an artist to throw crepe paper
out of an airplane. Again in 1984, the NEA came under congressional fire after Representative
Biaggi voiced opposition on the floor concerning a production of Verdi's "Rigoletto" that made the
opera's characters members of the Mafia. Enrique R. Carrasco, Note, The National Endowment for
the Arts: A Search for an Equitable Grant Making Process, 74 GEO. L.J. 1521, 1522-23 (1986). In
1985, Representatives Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, both Republicans from Texas, voiced opposi-
tion on the floor of the House to the financing of what they considered pornographic poems. Con-
gress responded by requesting that the endowment be more careful in the future. 131 CONG. REC.
6,985 (1985).
14. See, e.g., Donald Martin Reynolds, Fund Art for Community's Sake, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6,
1990, at 45.
15. According to Frohnmayer, "It was just all of a sudden, bang, a done deal." Kim Masters,
Art Chief Refuses To Be "Decency Czar" Hill Staff Critical Of Reaction To New Law, WASH. POST,
Dec. 15, 1990, at B1.
16. 136 CONG. REC. 16,637 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
17. William H. Honan, Arts Endowment Backers are Split on Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1990, § C, at 20.
18. 136 CONG. REC. S16,935-01 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
19. Id.
20. Cm. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1990, at 14. Others in arts community have also protested the de-
cency provision. For example, the Pacifica Foundation refused to apply for grants in 1991 and New
York theater producer Joseph Papp declined a $325,000 grant for the Shakespeare Festival. Mas-
1991]
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the decency prerequisite. Thereafter, the NEA Advisory Council voted
unanimously not to include any guidelines for the grant-making panels
concerning "standards of decency" explaining that the members of the
panels would apply them as a matter of course because of their diverse
makeup.2I The next day, NEA Chairman John Frohnmayer announced
his reluctance to be a "decency czar" and declared that he will not de-
cline any grants because they violate the decency requirement. 22 Accord-
ingly, the NEA has continued to honor grants to controversial artists and
organizations that use nudity in their productions. In 1991 the NEA
awarded $20,000 to Karen Finly and $15,000 to Holly Hughes for their
performance art.23 Both Finley and Hughes have been criticized for their
risque performance art.24 The NEA also approved a $163,000 grant to
support the 1991-92 season of the Washington Opera, although last year
there were two complaints about total nudity in some scenes from
Salome.
25
This Note focuses on the NEA decency requirement and argues that
this condition should fail to pass constitutional scrutiny under either of
two theories. First, the NEA decency requirement is an attempt by Con-
gress to regulate nonobscene protected speech. Second, the restriction is
so vague that people of average intellect would have to guess about its
meaning. Part I of this Note discusses the history of arts funding, look-
ing specifically at the NEA. 26 Part II will argue that the decency re-
quirement is an unconstitutional limitation on nonobscene indecent
sexual speech that is protected under the first amendment. 27 Part III
argues that the decency provision is also unconstitutionally vague. 28 Part
IV asserts that even though the restriction is merely a condition placed
on a subsidy, it is still unconstitutional because it infringes on the funda-
mental right of free speech. 29  Accordingly, this Note concludes with
suggestions that uphold Congress's preference to prevent the NEA from
ters, supra note 15, at B1; David Zimmerman, Next NEA Battle: Decency, GANNETr NEWS SERV.,
Dec. 10, 1990.
21. Honan, supra note 17, at 19.
22. Masters, supra note 15, at BI.
23. Barbara Gamarekian, Arts Endowment Reverses a Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1990, § 1, at
9. Art will be broadly defined in this Note to include any work which was produced with the
conscious desire to provoke thought.
24. William A. Henry III, "You Can Take This Grant and... "; Arts groups are spurning the
NEA's anti-obscenity clause, TIME, July 16, 1990, at 85.
25. Judith Weinraub, NEA Approves Delayed Grants, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1991, at Cl.
26. See infra notes 31 to 98 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 99 to 248 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 249 to 290 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 291 to 315 and accompanying text.
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funding obscene art. 30
I. GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING OF THE ARTS
In 1965, Congress approved and President Johnson signed into law
the National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities Act.3' The history
of the NEA has been recounted elsewhere 3 2 and need not be fully related
here. However, a brief historical discussion of art patronage is helpful in
order to place the recent 33 uproar over public support for the arts in
perspective and to evaluate the available alternatives.
A. Art grants before 1965
Art subsidies began in Europe during medieval times when the
church generously commissioned artists to create religious art for its
churches. 34 During the Renaissance, European aristocrats, especially in
Italy, continued financing arts, though most of their support went di-
rectly toward music. 35 However, in the United States there were many
reasons why the government did not support the arts until the twentieth
century. In early America, the religious puritan background coupled
with the high expense of leisure time led to a general repression of the
arts.36 However, after the Revolutionary War, there were two main
views concerning the democratic funding of the arts. Many Americans
felt the arts were not essential to everyday life and accordingly that the
young government could not afford to support them;3 7 while others, like
George Washington, felt that the arts were essential to the prosperity of
the new republic. 38 As a result of these two diverse ideas, an unwritten
30. See infra notes 316 to 318 and accompanying text.
31. Pub. L. No. 89-209, at 5, 79 Stat. 845, 846-49 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 951-968 (1988)), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 809, 811.
32. See Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts: Free Expression and Political Control,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1969-76 (1990); Carrasco, supra note 13, at 1524-29.
33. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Poor Taste Makes Bad Law, LEGAL TIMES, April 23, 1990, at 25.
The chaos surrounding arts funding has been evolving for years.
34. ALVIN TOFFLER, THE CULTURE CONSUMERS 168 (1964). See Carrasco, supra note 13, at
1524-29.
35. DONALD JAY GROUT & CLAUDE V. PALISCA, A HISTORY OF WESTERN Music 206 (4th
ed. 1988).
36. See Carrasco, supra note 13, at 1525. The early American view towards the arts is exempli-
fied by a 1665 case in which three Virginians were prosecuted for their production of a play and by a
1700 Pennsylvania statute that prohibits "stage plays, masks, [and] revels." TOFFLER, supra note 34,
at 13.
37. John Adams wrote "I must study politics and war that my sons may have the liberty to
study mathematics and philosophy ... geography, natural history and naval architecture, naviga-
tion, commerce and agriculture, in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry,
music, [and] architecture." Letter from John Adams to Portia Adams (1780), reprinted in 2 LET-
TERS OF JOHN ADAMS, ADDRESSED TO HIS WIFE 66, 68 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1841).
38. FRANNIE TAYLOR & ANTHONY L. BARRESI, THE ARTS AT A NEW FRONTIER 6 (1984).
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compromise was achieved which permitted government funding of the
arts only when it was "practically necessary" (i.e. would directly benefit
the government).3 9
This concept directed governmental arts funding for the next two
centuries. 4° For example, in the 1850s, when President Buchanan at-
tempted to create a National Commission of Fine Arts, Congress refused
to subsidize it.4 1 Yet, the lack of government sponsorship went largely
unnoticed because private individuals were willing and able to support
the arts. Many of these people were wealthy barons who amassed private
fortunes during the industrial revolution 42 and maintained museums, op-
era companies, 43 and symphonies."
During the first half of the twentieth century there were many prac-
tical reasons for governmental programs in support of the arts. How-
ever, the government did not finance the arts because of an altruistic
national need for cultural enrichment; rather, financing was motivated by
other forces. For example, in response to the large amounts of private
donations to the arts, President Taft attempted to establish a Commis-
sion for the Fine Arts in 1910.45 The Commission would not fund the
arts with governmental funds; instead, the President designed the Com-
mission to channel and appropriate the large amount of private dona-
tions to artists.46 Then, as part of the New Deal, Congress created the
Work's Progress Administration ("WPA") as a nationwide program to
finance public art. 47 Congress did not design the WPA to promote the
arts, but to help the unemployed.
48
In the 1940s, with the increased costs of war, congressional funding
for the WPA diminished sharply. 49 After the war and during the "Red
39. Id. For example, in 1790 the U.S. Marine Band was formed in order to give military splen-
dor for formal ceremonies and in 1800 the Library of Congress was established. Id.
40. Id.
41. LEONARD D. DUBOFF, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL 158 (1984).
42. See Carrasco, supra note 13, at 1525.
43. The theater was largely subsidized by William C. Ralston, a shipping and railroad baron.
TOFFLER, supra note 34, at 169.
44. TOFFLER, supra note 34, at 169-70. In 1881, the Boston Symphony Orchestra was founded
by Henry Lee Higginson, a wealthy financier. Id. at 62. Other affluent sponsors of the arts included
John Rockefeller, Thomas Corcoran, J.P. Morgan, Solomon Guggenheim, and Andrew Mellon. See
Carrasco, supra note 13, at 1525.
45. DUBOFF, supra note 41, at 158.
46. Id. at 159.
47. Id. at 160.
48. Id. At its peak, the WPA was responsible for the creation of 45,000 jobs through the
Federal Arts Project. DICK NETZER, THE SUBSIDIZED MUSE 54-55 (1978). Some FAP recipients
included Jackson Pollack, Mark Rothko, and David Smith. DuBOFF, supra note 41, at 160.
49. Karen M. Riggio, Comment, Mechanisms for Control and Distribution of Public Funds to
the Art Community, 85 DICK. L. REV. 629, 632 (1980-1981).
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Scare," the State Department organized displays of American art with
the purpose of touting the American way to the free world.50 However,
when Congress felt that the objectives of the WPA and the State Depart-
ment tours were met, they eradicated the programs. t
In the 1960s the United States led the world in scientific accomplish-
ments and had the highest standard of living in the world. 2 The federal
government was supporting the natural sciences at an astronomical rate
compared to federal subsidies for the arts. 53 Moreover, private contribu-
tions to the arts were no longer sufficient to properly support art pro-
grams.5 4 The insufficient funding of the arts resulted in art that was not
comparable to that of other countries. Congress was unwilling to toler-
ate an outside perception of the United States as culturally deficient.55
Political conditions were ideal for the inception of a direct federal subsi-
dization of the arts as part of President Johnson's Great Society.
B. The NEA
In 1965, the drafters of the NEA bill attempted to create an organi-
zation unbiased by political factors 56 that would champion only the
"best" work,57 and that would not subject recipients of federal funds to
governmental control.5 8 Congressional opponents of the bill were con-
cerned that governmental sponsorship of the arts would lead to de-
50. Note, supra note 32, at 1970 (citing Matthews, Art and Politics in Cold War America, 81
AM. HIST. REV. 762, 762-63, 770-71 (1976)); see also W. J. BAUMOL & W. G. BOWEN, PERFORM-
ING ARTS-THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA 357 (1966).
51. See BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 50, at 357.
52. See National Arts and Humanities Special Foundations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
the Arts and Humanities of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
258 (1965) (statement of Dr. Fredrick Darian, Professor of Music, Carnegie Institute of
Technology).
53. H.R. REP. No. 618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, (1965), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 3188-90.
54. Id. at 3188. The increased cost of arts production coupled with increasing inflation left the
future of the arts in doubt because private individuals were donating less. TAYLOR & BARRESI,
supra note 38, at 2. In 1960, the Metropolitan Opera Association was forced to cancel its season
after a labor strike. EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE DEMOCRATIC MUSE 47 (1984).
55. See NETZER, supra note 48, at 3. "The United States suffers from an inferiority complex
about its culture." TOFFLER, supra note 34, at 3.
56. To lessen the hazard of endowment positions given as "political payoffs", the chairman of
the Arts Endowment is a person who is known within the arts community and has "knowledge of, or
experience in, or [a] ... profound interest in" the arts. Pub. L. No. 89-209, at 5, 79 Stat. 845, 846-49
(1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (1988)), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 811.
57. Artistic excellence may be the only criterion used by the NEA for grant approval. See The
Grant Making Process of the National Endowment for the Arts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1984)
[hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of former NEA Chairman Hodsoll).
58. See LIVINGSTON BIDDLE, OUR GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS 149 (1988).
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creased private donations and mediocrity.5 9 Artistic freedom surfaced
as a recurring theme during the lengthy debates over the bill. The artists
wanted to ensure that the federal government would allow artists the
freedom to create art that was not of an "official" art form.6° Some crit-
ics of the bill feared that it would create "federal czars over the arts and
humanities."16' Other artistic and Congressional antagonists of the bill
felt that the bureaucratic hand should be "kept from the palate, the chisel
and the pen."' 62 In passing the National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities Act ("the Act"), Congress maintained that "[t]he encourage-
ment and support of national progress and scholarship in the humanities
and arts, while primarily a matter for private and local initiative, is also
an appropriate matter of concern to the Federal Government.
'63
The Act established the National Foundation on the Arts and Hu-
manities, comprised of the National Endowment for the Humanities
64
("NEH") and the NEA. 65 The Act provides for a Chairman of the
NEA. The Chairman will award the grants after considering various
standards that stress creativity, 66 the preservation of "professional excel-
lence,"16 7 "professional standards, '68 and the applicant's need for a
grant. 69 Most of the Endowment's funds are in the form of matching
grants. These require that half the cost of the project must be contrib-
59. NETZER, supra note 48, at 59. BANFIELD, supra note 54, at 60-61.
60. The concern over federal involvement in the arts is legitimate and has been outlined by
Juffras: "[t]he artist should be free to conceive his art in whatever manner he wishes. Artists have
revolted against the restrictions of tradition. . . . It is obvious that Western artists are counter-
cultural." Angelo Juffras, The Sociology ofAncient Art and Some Philosophical Implications, in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARTS 5, 6 (Mildred W. Weil & Duncan Hartley eds., 1975). Cf "[T]he artist's
point of view, I suppose, has always been reduced to its simplest terms, 'Give me the money, but do
not tell me what to do with it.' " Joint Hearings, supra note 57, at 57-58 (testimony of Chariton
Heston).
61. H.R. REP. No. 618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) (minority views), reprinted in 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3203. Perhaps this is what John Frohnmayer referred to when he
stated, "I am not going to be the decency czar." See Masters, supra note 15, at B1.
62. NETZER, supra note 48, at 59 n. 14. Artist Larry Rivers remarked that "The government
taking a role in art is like a gorilla threading a needle. It is at first cute, then clumsy, and most of all
impossible." TOFFLER, supra note 34, at 188-89.
63. National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, 79 Stat.
845 (codified in 20 U.S.C. § 951(l) (1976)).
64. The National Endowment for the Humanities provides grants to encourage scholarship in
the humanities. 20 U.S.C. § 958. The distinction between the NEH and the NEA has been de-
scribed by an NEH staff member as, "Arts deals with people who can write but can't spell; Humani-
ties supports those who can spell but can't write." VIRGINIA P. WHITE, GRANTS: HOW TO FIND
THEM AND WHAT TO Do NEXT 90 (1975).
65. 20 U.S.C. § 953 (a).
66. Id. § 954(c)(1).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 954(c)(2).
69. Id. § 954(c)(3).
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uted by nonfederal sources. 70 One type of matching grant is called the
challenge grant, which requires a three-to-one ratio of private support to
federal dollars.
7 1
An applicant must endure careful scrutiny before the NEA will
award a grant. First, the applicant must describe both the subject matter
and the anticipated audience of the proposed art, summarize the esti-
mated costs of the project, specify the total amount requested from the
NEA, and provide figures regarding the overall fiscal activity, including
information about private sources of funding. 72 The applications are
usually submitted one fiscal year before the applicant needs the funds.
NEA staff members review the application to decide if the applicant has
complied with all legal requirements. Then the staff directs the applica-
tions to a Peer Advisory Panel that examines the application and gives its
recommendations to the National Council.73 The Council then makes
suggestions to the Chairman who is ultimately responsible for granting
approval.
74
Since 1965, Congress has modified the NEA to accommodate both
internal and external pressures. 75 The NEA aspirations for a greater
budget 76 and significant obligations to large organizations lead to a more
formalized grant-making procedure where delegates from diverse back-
grounds and communities make funding determinations. 77  Unfortu-
nately, external pressures 78 have not commanded the same positive
reaction. Since its inception, there have been seven NEA reauthorization
hearings, 79 which have typically been forums for Congress to illustrate its
displeasure over arts funding.80
C. The 1989 and 1991 NEA Appropriations Bills
During the present tense climate between the arts community and
70. VIRGINIA P. WHITE, GRANTS FOR THE ARTS 64 (1980).
71. Id. at 65.
72. Walter Cronkite, Introduction to Part III. Points of Conflict-Legal Issues Confronting Media
Today, 60 GEo. L.J. 1001, 1053-54 (1972).
73. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE ARTS, OUR PROGRAMS 7 (1972).
74. Id. The selection of a chairman, members of the Panels and Council are made after a
thorough process. See Riggio, supra note 49, at 637-38.
75. See Note, supra note 32, at 1974.
76. Congress appropriated $2.5 million for the NEA in 1966. See TAYLOR & BARRESI, supra
note 38, at 75. For 1991, Congress appropriated $175 million to the NEA. 136 CONG. REC.
S17,975-95 (daily edition of Oct. 24, 1990).
77. See Note, supra note 32 at 1974-75.
78. See sources cited supra note 13.
79. See Mulcahy, The Politics of Cultural Oversight: The Reauthorization Process and the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts, in CONGRESS AND THE ARTS: A PRECARIOUS ALLIANCE? 81-82
(Margaret J. Wyszomirski ed. 1988).
80. Id.
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the right wing,81 Congress has again had to confront the issue of appro-
priations for the NEA. In 1989, Congress interjected explicit content
restrictions in the NEA's 1990 fiscal funding bill. The bill stipulated that
no funds authorized for appropriation for the NEA, or the NEH, may be
used to "promote, disseminate, or produce [art that the NEA may con-
sider] obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomachism,
homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals en-
gaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. ' '8 2 The 1989 Bill contained
serious constitutional infirmities8 3 because it infringed upon protected
speech.
84
President Bush took a "half step toward free speech" 85 when he
signed into law the 1991 Appropriations Bill, which funds the NEA for
an additional three years. The new law is free of the explicit restrictions
that the 1989 Bill imposed on the NEA. However, the new statute re-
quires the NEA Chairman to ensure that grants are only made after
"taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."' 86 It additionally
provides that if a court deems an NEA funded project obscene, the artist
or institution that produced the art must repay the grant to the NEA or
lose the possibility of receiving future grants for three years. 87
Recently the NEA received a boost of its funding of the popular and
highly acclaimed Civil War series on PBS.8 8 Yet, John Frohnmayer and
the NEA have once again come under fire by Rev. Donald Wildmon,
president of the American Family Association.89 He claims that the
NEA-funded movie "Poison," winner at this year's Sundance Film Festi-
81. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
82. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989).
83. A District Judge in Los Angeles ruled that the mandatory obscenity pledge was unconstitu-
tional. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Calif. 1991). The
NEA argued that it was not restricting free expression because the recipients could just go elsewhere
for their grants. Id. at 785. But, the court disagreed stating that, "[t]his is the type of obstacle in the
path of the exercise of fundamental speech rights that the constitution will not tolerate." Id.
84. While obscene speech has been construed as being unprotected by the first amendment, the
production and even sale of depictions of sadomachism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of
children, or individuals engaged in sex acts without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value is protected by the Constitution. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See infra notes
151-88 and accompanying text.
85. A Half Step Toward Free Speech, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1988, at 28.
86. Amendment No. 3130, 136 CONG. REC. S17,975 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
87. 136 CONG. REC. S19,395 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990).
88. Elizabeth Kastor, Bush Budget Slights NEA, WAsH. Posr, Feb. 5, 1991, at Cl.
89. Arts Agency Denies Movie is Obscene, CH. TaRn., Mar. 30, 1991, at 4.
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val, "includes explicit porno scenes." 90 Wildmon is referring to a section
of the movie where a young thief is sent to prison and while attempting
to escape is raped, brutalized and shot. Frohnmayer acknowledged that
the NEA did give $25,000 for the film's editing. Yet, he called the film
nonobscene and not prurient when taken as a whole. Wildmon later ad-
mitted that he had not seen the film. 9 1
During the 1992 presidential primaries, Patrick Buchanan took a
page out of President Bush's book on campaigning 92 when he criticized
President Bush for subsidizing the NEA, which he labeled an "uphol-
stered playpen of the arts and crafts auxiliary of the Eastern liberal estab-
lishment" 93 that championed "filthy and blasphemous" 94 works. To
further express his views, Buchanan also aired television commercials
that accused the NEA of advocating art that "exploited children and
perverted the image of Jesus Christ" to a backdrop of Marlon Riggs'
documentary entitled "Tongues Untied." 9 5 One day after the issue arose,
John Frohnmayer announced his retirement from the NEA, effective
May 1, 1992.96 It is likely that Anne-Imelda Radice will be named the
acting director of the NEA. 97 She is the current NEA deputy director
and is seen by many as a conservative who would impose content restric-
tions on NEA grants.98
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE DECENCY REQUIREMENT
The function of the Constitution is not to enforce popular opinions,
but instead to defend unpopular opinions and ideas from majoritarian
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. There is a clear correlation between the Buchanan tactics of criticizing Bush for his funding
of the NEA, and the 1988 presidential campaign, when Bush ran commercials that attacked Michael
Dukakis for the Massachusetts early furlough program, that released convicted rapist Willie Horton.
Michelle Quinn, Buchanan TVAd Angers Filmmaker, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at F4.
93. Deborah Zabarenko, Art or Pornography: Unlikely Battlefield for Presidential Race,
REUTERS, Mar. 2, 1992. This type of bashing has been labeled "politiporn." See Murray Kempton,
Long Walk Down The Low Road, NEWSDAY, Mar. 1, 1992, at 39.
94. Buchanan Celebrates Exit of Embattled Arts-Fund Head, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb.
24, 1992, at A8.
95. Patti Hartigan, Arts Scene Shaken by Resignation of NEA Chairman, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 28, 1992, at 25.
96. Id. It is more accurate to state that White House Chief of Staff, Samuel Skinner, demanded
Frohnmayer's resignation in an attempt to diffuse the criticism of Bush. As Congressman Sidney
Yates stated, "[t]here is no doubt that he is one of the casualties of the New Hampshire election.
The people in the White House want to avoid possible vulnerability from the conservative wing of
the party." Buchanan Celebrates Exit of Embattled Arts-Fund Head, THE GAZETTE (Montreal),




limitations on individual liberty. 99 The framers of the Constitution pre-
sumed that the legislative branch would represent majority views'0°
while the first amendment would protect the views of minorities. The
first amendment comes into play when the majority convinced beyond
any doubt that something should not be said, written, or expressed would
like to silence the minority. The first amendment provides that "Con-
gress shall pass no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 10 1 Speech
has been defined as any expression of thoughts through conduct. 0 2 Ac-
cordingly, governmental suppression or censorship of written, 0 3 spo-
ken,' ° 4 symbolic, 0 5 and artistic expression1 0 6 has often been curbed
when the Court invoked the free speech passage. 107
Every taxpayer has the right to ensure that the government is not
appropriating their tax dollars for unlawful activities. However, it is not
now, nor has it ever been, illegal to produce art that merely offends some
subjective standard of decency. The decency requirement is a vague,
content-based regulation of protected nonobscene artistic speech. The
decency requirement, as a condition upon the receipt of an NEA subsidy,
amounts to an obstacle in the path of free speech.
A. First Amendment Methodology
In the first amendment context, government restrictions imposed be-
99. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
100. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
101. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
102. Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (first amendment protects
press reports); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (newspaper
publishing "The Pentagon Papers" received first amendment protection); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931) (newspaper article charging police with neglect of duty received first amendment
protection).
104. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (defendants shouted statements
entitled to first amendment protection); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam)
(defendants verbal references to shooting the President of the United States entitled to first amend-
ment protection); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (restrictions on loudspeakers unconstitu-
tional infringement on free speech).
105. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning the American flag was protected);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1973) (taping a peace symbol to an upside down American flag
was protected expression); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (the words, "Fuck the Draft"
worn into court was protected); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam war was protected expression); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (flying red flag as a symbol of opposition to the government was
protected expression).
106. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (no jury could properly find the movie
Carnal Knowledge obscene); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (defendant has right to possess
obscene movie); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (first
amendment protects distribution of the film Lady Chatterley's Lover).
107. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 909-10, § 12-16 (2d ed. 1988).
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cause of the message communicated have historically been subject to in-
tense scrutiny; however, the Court gives restrictions that limit
communication without regard to the message conveyed a lower level of
judicial review.10 8 The two types of restrictions on speech are content-
based and content-neutral.
Content-neutral restrictions do not make any reference to the con-
tent of the speech, the viewpoint, or the opinion of the speaker. 10 9 Tradi-
tionally, the Court has applied either the time, place and manner test or
the incidental test to content-neutral regulations." 0 The Court intro-
duced the time, place and manner principle in the late 1930s and
1940s.II Today the test requires that all content-neutral regulations be
justified by a "significant government interest" and must preserve "ample
alternative channels" for the expression of the interest. 11 2 The incidental
regulation standard provides that if the claimed conduct is actually pro-
108. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 46-54 (1986); TRIBE, supra note 107,
at 789-92; Paul P. Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, VA. L. REV. 203,
214-31 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 113, 121-27 (1981).
109. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). In Cox, the Court upheld a New Hampshire
statute that required all participants to obtain a license before marching in a parade or procession on
a public street. Id. The Court reasoned that "[i]f a municipality has authority to control the use of
its public street for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to
give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other
proper uses of the streets." Id. at 576.
110. David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491, 495
(1988) (citing David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content Neutral Standardsfor the Free Speech
Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 197; Fredrick K. Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the
Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 785 (1985);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987)).
111. David Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the Judge-
ment of Public Officials, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 175, 205 (1985). See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
112. Virginia Bd. Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976);
see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (a protester who was distributing leaflets con-
taining the text of the first amendment on the steps of the Supreme Court proved that the federal
statute, which prohibited that type of activity on the grounds, was unconstitutional as applied where
the Court found the statute to be content-neutral); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (political demonstrators unsuccessful at challenging camping permit re-
quirements for occupation in tent cities because the statute was found content-neutral for time, place
and manner); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981)
(Court found content-neutral a regulation that required sales, distribution and solicitation activities
confined to certain "fixed" booths.). The Court requires that substantial restrictions have an equally
substantial state interest. See Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963). Further, the Court will not view a content-neutral restriction as neutral if it is
applied in such a way that it singles out certain speech. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951). The Court will prevent the government from using content-neutral regulations as a guise for
content regulation. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980). See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Court employed content-based test where it found that
the school adopted a prohibition on armbands after learning of the student's plan of protest.).
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tected then the Court will decide what amount of protection is proper. 13
"[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its sub-
ject matter, or its content." ' 1 4 This often-cited passage is the cornerstone
for evaluating content-based restrictions. However, in application the
Court has never literally followed this principle. Instead the Court has
followed a different approach when ruling in this area: if the speech is
fully protected the Court will require the government to prove the justifi-
cation for the restriction against a heavy burden;' 1 5 yet, if the speech is
unprotected the government only needs to show a rational basis for the
restriction. "16
When the government attempts to control the expression of a spe-
cific position, the Court will employ a higher level of scrutiny.1 17 This
type of regulation will nearly always be struck down because it amounts
to censorship. 1 8 The courts have held that, "the people in our democ-
racy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the
relative merits of conflicting arguments ... if there be any danger that
the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced, it is
a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment." 119
Further, this type of restriction reduces the free marketplace of ideas,120
prevents individuals from searching for the truth, 121 prevents participa-
113. Day, supra note 110, at 500 (citing Laurie Magid, Note, First Amendment Protection of
Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467, 468 (1984)).
114. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citations omitted).
115. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986).
116. See TRIBE, supra note 107, at 832.
117. Li Sa Yoshida, Note, The Role of "Secondary Effects" in the First Amendment Analysis:
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 161 (1987).
118. See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (Court found unconstitutional a
statute that forbid actors from wearing military uniforms in a movie or play if the portrayal tended
to dishonor the military.).
119. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
120. This concept has been credited to Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919), where he pronounced:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no
doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition .... But when men
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired
is better reached byfree trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
However, sixty years earlier John Stuart Mill explained that there is an important benefit in
being exposed to ideas and attitudes different to one's own. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2
(Norton ed. 1975).
121. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).
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tion in self-governance, 22 and attainment of self-fulfillment. 123
Through the decency requirement, the NEA is forced to treat art
that violates a standard of decency differently from the way it treats
other art. This restriction must be examined by looking to the content of
the speech. Therefore, the restriction will be characterized as content-
based and accordingly any unconstitutional infringement will be ex-
amined under a high level of scrutiny. For purposes of deciding if art
that violates "standards of decency" can be constitutionally regulated,
this Note will next attempt to classify that type of work by discussing
obscene speech and nonobscene indecent speech.'
24
The Supreme Court has not considered all forms of speech as equal.
Justice Holmes first articulated this idea in 1919 when he explained that
the first amendment would not protect someone from falsely screaming
fire in a theater. 25 The hierarchy established in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire initiated only a "two-level theory."' 126 Under this concept
some forms of expression are considered low-value and are thus entitled
to less protection than the high-value or more traditional forms of
expression. 1
27
However, since Chaplinsky, the Court has gradually adopted a hier-
archy of speech in first amendment law. 128 The only clear characteriza-
tions are at the ends of the spectrum. Political speech is generally seen as
highly protected, 29 while obscene speech,130 child pornography 3 1 and
fighting words 132 are left totally unprotected by the first amendment. In
122. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT (1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
123. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
124. Professor Sunstein suggests that in deciding whether certain categories constitute "low
value speech", the cases suggest the relevance of the following: 1) whether the speech is "far afield
from the central concerns of the first amendment"; 2) whether the speech is cognitive or noncogni-
tive; 3) whether the speaker is attempting to communicate a message; and 4) whether the govern-
ment is "acting for constitutionally impermissible reasons." Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the
First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 603-04.
125. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Commentators generally consider polit-
ical speech as the most protected in the spectrum of protected speech and obscene speech the least
deserving of protection. Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory.- The Beauti-
ful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 221, 222; see also Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 Sup.
CT. REV. 191, 217-19.
126. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
127. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10.
128. See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 125, at 222.
129. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
130. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
131. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
132. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). However, even though Chaplinsky
has never been expressly overruled and may reemerge, it seems that fighting words are now consid-
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the middle are a number of other types of speech,' 3 3 including: commer-
cial speech, 134 defamatory speech,135 and indecent or offensive speech. 1
36
B. Obscenity
Public concern with the legal repression of obscene materials is a
relatively novel occurrence. 137 The Framers of the Constitution did not
consider the issue monumentally serious, possibly because many of them
were buyers or makers of lewd literature. 138 Thus, it took the Supreme
Court many years to finally address the obscenity issue; it did not pro-
nounce an opinion on the topic until 1948.139
However, throughout constitutional history the lower federal courts
considered obscenity significant and heard many cases which have a
bearing on current obscenity law. At first, American courts recognized
obscene speech as speech, and thus allowed it to be regulated only to
protect children and other vulnerable members of society. This concept
has its origin in the English case of Regina v. Hicklin,140 cited as authori-
tative support in many early obscenity cases. 14 In Hicklin, Lord Chief
Justice Cockburn defined obscenity as any material that has the "ten-
dency . .. to deprave and corrupt" its most defenseless potential view-
ers. 142 Under this test works such as D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterly's
ered protected, apparently because the Court fears arrests may be made based merely on the content
.of the speech.
133. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (attorney advertising); Mills v. Elec-
tric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (corporate proxy statements); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969) (employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees).
134. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(commercial speech entitled to somewhat less protection than political speech).
135. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel entitled to procedural but not
substantive protection).
136. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
137. The first reported obscenity case in the United States occurred in Commonwealth v. Sharp-
less, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (1815), where a Pennsylvania court declared that to exhibit a picture of a
nude couple for profit was an offense. However, despite Sharpless, prior to the Civil War there were
few attempts to regulate obscene speech. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1203 (2d. ed. 1991).
138. Benjamin Franklin was said to have written a story about Polly Baker. Polly was prose-
cuted five times for giving birth to bastard children. During the trial, she begged the court not to
"turn natural and useful Actions into Crimes." Benjamin Franklin, The Speech of Miss Polly Baker,
GENERAL ADVERTISER (London), April 15, 1747, reprinted in MAX HALL, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
AND POLLY BAKER app. 165 (1960).
139. In Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), the Court affirmed the attempt to
suppress Memoirs of Hecate County written by Edmund Wilson, who has been called America's
foremost literary critic. STONE ET AL., supra note 137, at 1203.
140. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
141. See MacFadden v. United States, 165 F. 51 (3d. Cir. 1908); United States v. Clarke, 38 F.
500 (D.C. Cir. 1889); United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571).
142. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371.
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Lover 143 and Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy' 44 were sup-
pressed in Massachusetts.
However, in 1913 Judge Learned Hand questioned the Hicklin stan-
dard because he felt the definition was based on Victorian morals and not
the morals of the day.145 In 1933, in United States v. One Book Called
"Ulysses", 146 a federal court outright rejected the Hicklin standard as a
test for obscenity. The Ulysses Court found two problems with the Hick-
lin standard. First, it effectively constrained adults to observing materi-
als only suited for children. 47 Second, it did not require a court to
consider the work as a whole, and thus, obscenity could be found based
solely on isolated sections of a work. 48 Over the next twenty years more
courts rejected the Hicklin standard while others accepted it.
This section will attempt to unravel obscenity law by focusing on
three seminal Supreme Court decisions: Roth v. United States,149
Memoirs v. Massachusetts,'50 and Miller v. California.'51 In Roth v.
United States,152 the Supreme Court addressed the split in the circuits
over an appropriate obscenity test. Yet it only managed to further con-
fuse the legal definition. However, this was the first case where the ob-
scene speech was expressly found' 53 to no longer be entitled to first
amendment protection. 154 The Court reached this result only after find-
ing obscene speech "utterly without redeeming social importance."'' 55
Obscenity now joined fighting words as unprotected by the first amend-
ment.156 In finding that obscenity was beyond the shelter of the Consti-
tution, the Court had to espouse a definition for obscene speech. The
Roth standard for obscenity centered on "whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, [found that] the dominant
143. Commonwealth v. DeLacey, 171 N.E. 455 (Mass. 1930).
144. Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N.E. 472 (Mass. 1930).
145. United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 120 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1913).
146. 72 F.2d 705 (2d. Cir. 1934).
147. Id. at 707-08.
148. Id.
149. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
150. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
151. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
152. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
153. The Supreme Court alluded to this in an earlier case, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, where
it declared that "lewd and obscene.., utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
154. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
155. Id. at 484.
156. Fighting words are words directed to the hearer which would have a tendency to cause acts
of violence by the person to whom the remark is addressed. They are not protected because by their
very utterance they inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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theme of the material taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient inter-
est." 157 The Court also stated that obscenity was not "synonymous"
with sex and that artistic, literary, or scientific works could be
obscene. '
5 8
Succeeding obscenity cases before the Court have done nothing
more than attempt to fill in the omissions and explain the ambiguities in
Roth.159 For example, nine years later' 6° in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,'
6 1
the Court, in a plurality opinion, expanded the definition of obscenity
and pronounced that the following three factors must "coalesce" before
material will be found obscene and thus outside of constitutional protec-
tion: "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description
or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly with-
out redeeming social value."'
162
Between 1966 and 1973 the Court did not uphold any obscenity
conviction it reviewed 63 that dealt with distributing sexual materials to
adults, except those cases involving "hard core" pornography.' 64 Fi-
157. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. The Court defined prurient interest as any "material having a ten-
dency to excite lustful thoughts." Id. at 487 n.20. Justice Brennan stated for the majority that this
definition is essentially the same as the definition set forth by the American Law Institute in MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.10(2). Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20; see also William B. Lockhart & Robert C.
McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5,
55-58 (1960).
158. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
159. William B. Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First
Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 538 (1975). See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
160. Although none of the majority decisions between 1957 and 1966 added anything considera-
ble to the standard, two opinions fostered some views about the standard that were later confirmed
by the majority in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
191 (1964) (Brennan & Goldberg, JJ., plurality) advocated a social value theory, and Manual Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., plurality) supported a theory of
offensiveness.
161. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
162. Id. at 418.
163. See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972);
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S.
351 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Walker
v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Rabeck v. New York, 391
U.S. 462 (1968); Felton v. Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968); Teitle Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139
(1968); Holding v. Blankenship, 387 U.S. 94 (1967); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
164. See, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). The Court later cited the following as
example of "hard core": "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
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nally, in the 1973 landmark case of Miller v. California,t 65 the Court,
reorganized with four Nixon appointees, 66 agreed on an appropriate ob-
scenity test. In revising the Roth-Memoirs test, the Court announced
that to be considered obscene a trier of fact must follow the basic guide-
lines of:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a pa-
tently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applica-
ble state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.1 67
In Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 68 decided on the same day as
Miller, the Court held that distribution of obscene materials could be
banned, even where the exposure was limited to consenting adults. 69
This Court based its holding on the government's "right. . . to maintain
a decent society."' 70 Three additional obscenity cases were decided dur-
ing the same term which applied the Miller standard to: private interstate
transportation of films; '7' importation for an importer's private use;1 72
and printed descriptions of sexual activities. 73 Since Miller, two cases
have further modified the test. In Smith v. United States, 74 the Court
stressed that prurient appeal and patent offensiveness were questions of
fact to be evaluated by applying contemporary community standards. 75
Then in Pope v. Illinois, 76 the Court decreed that the third Miller prong
(i.e. serious value) should be decided according to a reasonable person
standard.' 77 Additionally, the Court has emphasized that the boundary
between protected and unprotected expression must be "finely drawn"
and requires "sensitive tools" for any separation.178 As a result, statutes
165. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
166. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
167. 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 498 U.S. at 230 (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))).
168. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 59 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
171. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
172. United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
173. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
174. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
175. 431 U.S. at 292-93.
176. 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
177. Id. One commentator argued that even with the inherent problems of the national standard
test it would still be better than the "community standards" prong of the test. Susan Elkin, Note,
Taking Serious Value Seriously, 41 MIAMi L. REv. 855 (1990). Another author criticizes the test
because it fails to recognize the ability of post-modern artists to laugh at the world and themselves.
Amy M. Adler, Note, Post Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990).
178. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
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devised to restrict obscenity must be cautiously designed to avoid the
dangers associated with a "chilling effect"' 179 that results in reducing the
production of nonobscene art. '
80
The definition of obscenity has been defined and modified by the
Court several times in order to reach a generally acceptable definition. 
18
As Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris reflects, there are many problems
with the current test for obscenity. Justice Brennan, the author of the
Roth decision, concluded that even though there have been many modifi-
cations to the definition of obscenity, they were invariably and unconsti-
tutionally vague.1 82 He specifically argued that the standards failed to
give adequate notice regarding what conduct was prohibited and there-
fore had a chilling effect upon speech. 183 This view has since been advo-
cated by Justice Scalia when he noted "the need for reexamination of
Miller."1
84
Yet, the Court has struggled with the Roth-Memoirs-Miller obscen-
ity test for so long that it is unrealistic to believe that it will be overruled.
Instead, the Court will likely add to and subtract from the test so many
times that eventually it will become obsolete, except as a footnote in the
long history of obscenity tests. Until the Court realizes that obscene
speech is speech and should be protected, litigants are forced to apply the
vague and unhelpful Roth-Memoirs-Miller obscenity test.
1 85
The current NEA Appropriations Act requires that the Chairman
only grant recipients funds for art that does not offend standards of de-
cency. Even though Congress was attempting to obstruct the funding of
obscene art, in its haste Congress passed the decency provision which
results in catching nonobscene art in the web of unprotected speech. It is
unlikely that the average person applying contemporary community
standards will necessarily find that all art that violates a standard of de-
179. See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
"Chilling Effect", 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689-94 (1978).
180. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
181. Justice Harlan remarked, a decade after Roth, that "obscenity has produced a variety of
views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudica-
tion." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968). "[In the] thirteen obscenity cases [since
Roth] in which signed opinions were written, [there] has been a total of 55 separate opinions among
the Justices." Id. at 704 n.L
182. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
also declared his dissatisfaction with the Roth obscenity approach. He noted that it "cannot bring
stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First Amendment values, and I
have concluded that the time has come to make a significant departure from that approach." Id. at
73-74.
183. Id. at 86-88.
184. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
185. TRIBE, supra note 107, at 909.
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cency also appeals to the prurient interest. It is also doubtful that all art
that breaches a standard of decency also depicts or describes sexual con-
duct in a patently offensive way. However, even assuming arguendo that
a standards of decency provision meets the first two prongs of the Miller
test, no piece of art, when taken as a whole, could lack important or
significant artistic value.18 6 Few pieces of art have ever been construed
as obscene because of the difficulty in jumping over the hurdle of the
third prong of Miller. 1
8 7
Many people believed that the NEA-funded Mapplethorpe exhibit
was obscene. However, a jury in Cincinnati, one of the most conserva-
tive cities in the country, found that the exhibit was not obscene.' 8
Whether they would have found that it violated a standard of decency is
not known. However, it is apparent that Congress and the NEA cannot
label art that merely offends some arbitrary standard of decency as ob-
scene and leave it without any protection whatsoever.' 8 9 Thus, we must
determine if art that would violate a standard of decency is unconstitu-
tional even though it is classified as indecent speech.
C. Nonobscene Indecent Speech
Over the last twenty years the Court has followed a policy of treat-
ing nonobscene offensive or indecent speech with less protection than
other speech. 190 The framework for this view originated in a 1942 case' 9'
where Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, explained that certain
classes of words by their very nature cause injury. 192 Therefore, he
stated, preventing the use of these words would not prompt any constitu-
tional problems. 193 The Court defended the repression of these words by
balancing the importance of the first amendment against the societal in-
terest in preventing a listener's emotional injury. 194
186. The definition of "serious" has never been fully explained by the Court. See Elkin, supra
note 177, at 855. However, it is absurd to reason that the Court intended to define obscenity on the
ability of the work to invoke laughter.
187. But see Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (2 Live
Crew album, As Nasty as They Want to Be, found obscene).
188. Isabel Wilkerson, Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1.
189. Emerson suggests that the government could regulate obscenity to protect individuals
against the "shock effect" of unwanted exposure to obscene speech. He believes that "a communica-
tion of this nature, imposed upon a person contrary to his wishes, has all the characteristics of a
physical assault." EMERSON, supra note 123, at 496. However, this line of reasoning is flawed.
190. See generally Philip J. Prygoski, Low- Value Speech: From Young to Fraser, 32 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 317 (1987).
191. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
192. Id. at 572.
193. Id.
194. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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When the Roth Court declared only obscene speech unprotected by
the first amendment, it implied that the first amendment would protect
less explicit sexual' 95 or offensive speech.196 The Court has generally up-
held this proposition when the regulation concerned profane speech.
However, the Court's treatment of sexually indecent speech has proven
that the Court will not always follow this rule, unless the Court believes
the speech has some artistic merit.
In 1971 the Court upheld the implication that the first amendment
would protect nonobscene speech when it found offensive language pro-
tected in Cohen v. California. 197 In Cohen, the Court overturned a con-
viction of a protester who wore a jacket painted with the words "Fuck
the Draft" in the local courthouse.' 98 The Court based its decision on
the following factors: the speech was political, the context of the speech
was not erotic, and there was no captive audience.' 99
Six years later, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,2°° the same issue
arose again, this time in the context of whether the Federal Communica-
tions Commission had the power to regulate a nonobscene, but profane
radio broadcast. A radio station owned by Pacifica broadcast George
Carlin's twelve minute monologue, titled "Filthy Words,"' 20 ' at 2:00 in
the afternoon, when children were supposedly in the audience.20 2 A man
who heard part20 3 of the broadcast while driving with his son complained
to the FCC. The FCC did not assess any formal charges, but it did place
195. See Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) ("'[n]udity alone' does not place other-
wise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment") (quoting Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974)).
196. Robert D. Potter, Jr., Note, The Regulation of Telephone Pornography-Sable Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 447 (1987).
197. 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 19-22.
200. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
201. The seven dirty words "you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you
definitely wouldn't say, ever . . . were shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.
Those are the ones that will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe, even
bring us, God help us, peace without honor (laughter)." Id. at 751. The entire monologue is re-
printed as an appendix to the Pacifica opinion. Id. at 751-55.
202. Id. at 732. While the complaint was brought by a man who heard the broadcast while in
the car with his son, there is no evidence that any other children heard the broadcast. Id. at 730. To
the contrary, no one could reasonably assume that there were children in the listening audience at
2:00 in the afternoon because most of them are in school at that time of the day. Also, the radio
station, WBAI, does not play popular "top forty" music, instead it targets an adult, left-to-radical,
upper-middle-class audience. TRIBE, supra note 107, at 937 (citing Nicholas von Hoffman, Nine
Justices for Seven Dirty Words, MORE, June 1978 at 12; Amicus Brief of American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.).
203. He did not hear the warning at the beginning of the show, which explained that the broad-
cast included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." Pacifica, 438 U.S.
at 730.
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an order granting the complaint in Pacifica's licensing file for possible
future use.20 4 The FCC based its regulatory power on a federal statute
that allows the regulation of "any obscene, indecent or profane language
by means of radio communication. ' 205 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, held that the FCC order did not violate the first amendment. 20 6
The Court found that the government could regulate "indecent" speech
even though it was not obscene.20 7 Its justification for the regulation was
the unique properties of the broadcast industry, which could intrude into
the home, coupled with the potential harm to children resulting when
they hear profane speech. Therefore, it appears that profane speech will
be protected unless the justification for the regulation is the protection of
minors in a captive audience.20 8 Even profane speech that has the pur-
pose of sexual excitement has been held to the same standard. 2°9
Yet, in the 1976 case of Young v. American Mini Theaters,210 the
Court was faced with the question of how to handle sexually indecent
speech. In that case Justice Stevens laid out the framework for the treat-
ment of nonobscene sexual speech that the Court has applied since. 21' In
Young, the Court addressed the question of the constitutionality of con-
tent-based zoning ordinances in Detroit. Specifically, the ordinances di-
rected that all "adult theaters" 21 2 must be located a particular distance
from "regulated uses."' 213 The purpose of the regulation was to scatter
the theaters throughout the city so that adult theaters would not con-
verge in one area.214 The regulation did not purport to regulate obscene
204. Id.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). The test for indecent speech is based on the second Miller prong,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), which requires the work to be patently offensive. John
Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Curious History of the New FCC Broadcast Inde-
cency Policy, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 329, 330 n.6 (1989).
206. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
207. Id. at 741.
208. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (nominating speech at student
assembly held unprotected); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (broadcast of offensive
speech repeated over and over held unprotected where the regulation is for the protection of
children).
209. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (interstate transmission of
indecent commercial telephone messages (dial-a-porn) found protected because a child would have
to take some affirmative action to receive the indecent speech).
210. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
211. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
212. Theaters were classified as adult if they showed movies that highlighted certain sexual activ-
ities or anatomical areas. For definitions of these terms see Young, 427 U.S. at 53 n.4.
213. The theater could not be located within 1,000 feet of another adult theater, "mini" theater,
adult bookstore, cabaret, bar, hotel, motel, pawnshop, or pool hall. The theater also could not be
within 500 feet of any area zoned for residential purposes. Id. at 52 nn.2-3.
214. Id. at 54-55. The Detroit Common Council believed that a concentration of "adult" movie
theaters in one area led to the secondary effects of deterioration and crime. Id. at 55.
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speech 215 and accordingly does not include a provision for a judicial de-
termination of obscenity. 216
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance, stating that
"there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of mate-
rial that is on the borderline between pornography 217 and artistic expres-
sion than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political
significance. '21 8  Justice Stevens justified the second-class treatment of
borderline speech by maintaining that "few people would march [their
children] off to war for a person's right to view nonobscene, erotic mater-
ials in theaters of their choice. ' 219 Stevens then found the nonobscene
films regulated in Young on the borderline and undeserving of first
amendment protection.220
The opinion does not define what sexual expression the Court will
include on the border between pornography and artistic expression. The
lack of a definition leads to the same difficulty that the Court has with
obscenity where the terms have not and perhaps cannot be defined. 22
Another problem with the opinion is that Justice Stevens finds pornogra-
phy unprotected, though the Court has explicitly given it protection.222
The Court has stated that " '[n]udity alone' does not place otherwise pro-
tected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment" 223 and that
"sex and obscenity are not synonymous .... The portrayal of sex, e.g., in
art, literature and scientific works, is not itself [a] sufficient reason to
215. "This case does not involve ... a regulation of obscene expression or other speech that is
entitled to less than full protection of the First Amendment." Young, 427 U.S. at 84-85 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
216. Id. at 85 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
217. It is interesting to note the Court's use of the word pornography instead of obscenity. In
Miller the Court distinguished pornography from obscenity: "The word now means 'I: a description
of prostitutes or prostitution 2: a depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness: a
portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement.'... [Obscene material is] 'offensive
to the senses, or to taste or refinement; disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable, loathsome.' "
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19 n.2. (1973) (quoting Oxford English Dictionary (1933 ed.)). As
Frederick Schauer states: "certain uses of words, although speech in the ordinary sense, clearly are
not speech in the constitutional sense .... (Speech] is designed to appeal to the intellectual pro-
cess. . . . [H]ardcore pornography is designed to produce a purely physical effect .. . hardcore
pornography is sex, [not speech]." Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech" - Obscenity and "Ob-
scenity'" An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 906, 922,
923, 926 (1979), quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1206 (2d. ed. 1991); see
also ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1989).
218. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. at 61.
219. Id. at 70. This statement suggests that the only values worth protection under the first
amendment are those which are so important that one would send their children to war over the loss
of the values.
220. Id. at 70-73.
221. See supra text accompanying note 182.
222. See, e.g., Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981).
223. Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974)).
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deny [that] material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press."' 224 Justice Stewart dissented 225 from the Young majority and
insisted that if Steven's justification was correct then the first amendment
would only be reserved for "expression that more than a 'few of us'
would take up arms to defend, [and that] then the right of free expression
would be defined and circumscribed by current popular opinion. '226
Ten years later in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. ,227 the
Court returned to the issues raised in Young with the consideration of a
similar regulation. It prohibited any "adult motion picture theater" from
locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple-fam-
ily dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school. 228  In
this case the Court, claiming to base its holding on Young,229 viewed the
regulation as content-neutral 230 and upheld it. The Court did not explic-
itly mention Stevens' borderline speech theory, but it still treated the
nonobscene sexual speech as unprotected.
More recently in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,231 six justices of
the Court found that licensing and zoning schemes for regulation of adult
bookstores violated the first amendment where the government did not
follow the proper procedural safeguards. 232 The case was decided on
prior restraint grounds. Still, the case is relevant because it outlines the
Justices' different opinions about the treatment of adult bookstores. 233
The nude dancing cases provide an example of the treatment of sex-
ually indecent artistic speech. 234 Dancing is an artistic form of speech,
224. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
225. He was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
226. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 86 (1976).
227. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
228. Id. at 44.
229. Id. at 46 ("In our view, the resolution of this case is largely dictated by our decision in
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. ....").
230. Id. at 47 (Justice Rehnquist argued that the regulation did not aim at the content of the
films, but at the secondary effects that the theaters had on the surrounding communities.).
231. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
232. Id. at 229. The procedural requirements were outlined in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S
51 (1965). They include first, that the burden of proof rests with the censor; second, that the deci-
sion must be appealable to the judicial branch; and third, that the decision is made in a timely
manner. Id. at 58-60.
233. Justice O'Connor writing for the plurality, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, did not
believe it was necessary to address the question of the proper protection afforded to the adult thea-
ters. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 231. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that
under Young and Renton the government has a substantial interest in protecting the community
from the secondary effects of adult theaters. Id. at 236. Justice Scalia, would uphold regulations
against any business that has a "concentration of sexually orientated material." Id. at 264.
234. See R. George Wright, A Rationale from J.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 1985 Sup. CT.
REV. 149, 156, 166:
[flor something to be speech it must embody or convey a more or less discernable idea,
doctrine, conception, or argument of a social nature, where "social" is understood to in-
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and accordingly the Court has afforded it more first amendment protec-
tion than adult theaters. The first case where the Court had an opportu-
nity to confront the issue of nude dancing was California v. LaRue.235
In that 1972 case, the issue involved a regulation declaring that no liquor
shall be served in places where "certain grossly sexual exhibitions are
performed. ' 23 6 The majority, however, skirted around the issue of nude
dancing and upheld the state statute under the twenty-first amendment.
Nonetheless, Justice Marshall, in his dissent, argues that the regulation
should have been held unconstitutionally overbroad because it touches
both indecent and obscene speech. 237 While a majority of the Court did
not agree with Justice Marshall in LaRue, the Court came around a few
years later in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. ,238 where it found a regulation
that prohibited nude dancing in all public places to be overbroad. The
Court stated that nude dancing is entitled to first amendment protection
only "under [the] same circumstances." 239 However, in Schad v. Mt.
Ephraim,240 the Court found a zoning regulation that attempted to pro-
hibit all live entertainment overbroad because all live entertainment in-
cludes nonobscene nude dancing that is otherwise protected by the first
amendment.
241
The most recent Supreme Court nude dancing case is Barnes v. Glen
Theater, Inc.,242 in which the Court allowed nude dancing to be regu-
lated, even though it fell within the "outer perimeters of the First
Amendment. ' 243 Thus, the Court has shifted from a view in which nude
dancing was not protected, 244 to an ideology where it may be pro-
tected,245 to a doctrine where it is protected, 246 to a result where it is
clude broadly political, religious, ethical, and cultural concerns .... If the "message" of
commercial nude dancing is so shadowy and equivocal, however, it is too attenuated and
insubstantial [to constitute "speech" within a first amendment meaning].
235. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
236. Id. at 119 (Stewart, J., concurring).
237. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 138 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
239. Id. at 932.
240. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
241. Id. at 74. In a case involving the modeling of a child the Court upheld the regulation.
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1990). However, in their dissent, three members found nude
modeling protected. Id. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
243. Id. at 2460. For the first time the Court applied United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), to a specific proscription on individual conduct. Id. at 2472 (White, J. dissenting). It then
found that nude dancing could be narrowly regulated or forbidden in pursuit of an important or
substantial governmental interest, as long as that interest is unrelated to the content of the expres-
sion. Id. at 2460-63.
244. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
245. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
246. Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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protected yet can be infringed. 247 It is doubtful that the law in this area
has come to a rest or will be stabilized as long as the Court refuses to
completely protect low-value speech as speech.
248
Considering the Young, Renton, and Glen Theater holdings, it is
clear that the Court will give speech that lies somewhere between art and
pornography less than full protection under the first amendment, espe-
cially where the speech is sexual in nature. However, art would appear
to increase one's self-fulfillment more than nude dancing or adult thea-
ters. Additionally, it is not for the legislature to decide if this art is wor-
thy, but it is for individuals themselves to choose. Accordingly, the
amount of protection assigned to art that violates a standard of decency
should be greater than that afforded to adult theaters and nude dancing
that would violate the same standard of decency. Justice Stevens' bor-
derline theory provides the parameters of indecent speech as artistic inde-
cent speech and pornographic indecent speech. The Court has followed
this theory by leaving speech that it deems pornographic (adult theaters)
unprotected, while protecting speech that it believes to have some artistic
merit (nude dancing). Indecent art should be treated as deserving at least
as much protection from regulation as nude dancing is afforded. Neither
nude dancing nor indecent art is obscene. Also, both the nude dancing
regulations and the decency clause are aimed at preventing nonobscene
sexual speech. These two types of regulations differ in that nude dancing
can be seen as having the purpose of sexual arousal, while art has as its
purpose mental stimulation. Therefore, the restriction on nonobscene,
indecent art should be seen as unconstitutional because it infringes upon
protected speech.
III. VAGUENESS
The most common free speech claims of invalidation are over-
breadth and vagueness. The 1991 NEA Funding Bill provides a textbook
example of vagueness by requiring the Chairman to censor art before it is
given funding. It is not unusual for censorship bodies to embrace vague
language; the blurred borders of vague wording permits personal and
prejudicial decisions by the group. The 1991 NEA Appropriations Bill is
vague because it employs language that could be interpreted in so many
different ways that it erratically forces people of "common intelligence"
to "guess as to its meaning. ' 249 Vague statutes are void because the un-
247. Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
248. TRIBE, supra note 107, at 909-10.
249. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See Hoffman Estates v. Flip-
1991)
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certain language punishes the innocent without giving fair warning. 250
The NEA Appropriations Bill requires the chairman to ensure that
an artist adheres to the "standards of decency."'251  "Decency" is an
ambiguous and abstract term that has had many different meanings at-
tributed to it. It has been defined as "whatever is proper or becoming:
standards of propriety. ' 252 Propriety in turn has been defined as "so-
cially acceptable in conduct, behavior, [and] speech. ' 25 3 Everyone natu-
rally assigns different meanings to "proper," "becoming," and "socially
acceptable." Therefore, one would expect Congress to define what it
meant when it directed that the Chairman apply the term to a claimant's
proposed art. However, Congress did not supply any definition for the
phrase in the Act.
254
One cannot even guess at what Congress intended when it passed
the Amendment. If members of Congress were asked which art deserves
federal grants there probably would be different answers from each mem-
ber of the Senate and House of Representatives. The problem arises be-
cause Congress could not agree on which art was actually deserving of
funding and then passed this arbitrary "standards of decency" clause as a
means of pleasing the fundamentalist right wing.255
It is possible that Congress intended the definition used in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts that requires "extreme" or "outrageous"
conduct similar to what is required for an emotional distress claim.256
The Restatement definition was adopted in the emotional distress defini-
tions of several states: 257 Florida,258 Maryland, 259 Massachusetts,26°
side, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
250. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Due process demands that proper notice
be given before punishment. A vague statute violates the procedural aspects of the due processes
clause because it does not give adequate notice to individuals prior to punishment.
251. 136 CONG. REC. S16,635 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
252. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 584 (1981); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 366 (5th ed. 1979).
253. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 1819.
254. During the congressional debates concerning NEA funding Representative Conte stated
that "'[d]ecency' is not a word easily definable in legal terms." 136 CONG. REC. H12,417 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1990). Congressional use of the word elsewhere does not give the reader guidance. Con-
gress has recently used the term in debates over the Gulf War where a member of Congress men-
tioned that Saddam Hussein violated "standards of decency" when he used chemical weapons
against his own people. 136 CONG. REC. HI 1,512-02 (statements of Rep. Levine) (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1990).
255. See supra notes 3-11.
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
257. In California, however, the courts have used the "standard of decency" terminology as an
aid in determining whether a party has made a contract in bad faith. See, e.g., Neal v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 986 n.5 (Cal. 1978) (violation of community standards of decency or bad faith
can be equated with bad faith acquired from the Restatement of Contracts). It has also utilized the
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Utah,26 1 and Virginia. 262 However, it would be difficult for the NEA to
administer grants only to art that is not "extreme" or "outrageous."
Often modem art is attempting to shock society by being extreme and
outrageous. 263 Therefore, application of this definition of "standards of
decency" to NEA grants is theoretically improbable and practically
unworkable.
The Supreme Court has used the language "standards of decency"
frequently 264 in the eighth amendment context. The Court has estab-
lished 265 the principle that in defining cruel and unusual punishment, it
will look to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society ' 266 as a barometer of contemporary values. 267 The
Court looks to Congress for the prevailing standards of decency 268 be-
cause it feels that Congress possesses the most reliable and objective
source of contemporary views. 269
However, one cannot look to the eighth amendment cases for gui-
dance on a meaning for "standards of decency." It appears that the
Court is using the term to transfer death penalty accountability to Con-
gress and in turn to the public.270 Conceivably, the Court may again de-
liver the ideological responsibility to Congress by looking to it for
guidance in deciding whether the NEA Chairman applied "standards of
decency," in the grant-making process. As a result of all the ambiguity
term to describe a publication that is not newsworthy enough for protection under the freedom of
the press clause. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
258. See Anderson v. Rossman & Baumberger, 440 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
259. See Reagan v. Rider, 521 A.2d 1246, 1251 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
260. See Miga v. City of Holyoke, 497 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Mass. 1986) (for a successful punitive dam-
age emotional distress claim, conduct must be shocking to the conscience and offensive to all so as to
offend standards of decency).
261. See, e.g., White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah 1990); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d
344, 347 (Utah 1961).
262. See Womak v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 147-48 (Va. 1974).
263. See Adler, supra note 177, at 1359.
264. Standards of "common decency and honesty" was the criteria used in a 1939 breach of
fiduciary relationship agency case. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939). However, the phrase
has not been used before or since by the Court in an agency law context.
265. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978).
266. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (emphasis added); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279 (1983); McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183, 202 (1971).
267. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 346. The Supreme Court will also look to the states as
a vehicle in its determination of standards of decency. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989);
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
268. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
269. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). The members of the Court realize that punishment
by death is serious enough to warrant thoughtful adjudication. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
270. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-
96 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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surrounding the definition of "standards of decency" the judicial and leg-
islative branches have added little to the definition of decency advanced
by Webster, 271 leaving the NEA and artists confused over regulations
within the "standards of decency" phraseology. A top NEA official
stated that: "I'm at a loss to understand how ["standards of decency"]
can be, quote-regulated-unquote . . . . There's no accounting for
taste."' 2' 2 Therefore, the word "decency," without any guidance from
Congress as to its intended use, remains vague.
A vague regulation that even hints at constraining first amendment
freedoms can operate to inhibit the exercise of free speech. 273 The semi-
nal case on this chilling effect is Speiser v. Randall.274 In Speiser the
Court ruled that vague statutes cause people to "steer far wider of the
unlawful zone" than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were clearly
marked.275 In Speiser a vague oath was required of public employees.
The Court stated that "[tihose with a conscientious regard for what they
solemnly swear or affirm" could only avoid the threatened sanction "by
restricting their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free
speech may not be so inhibited.
'276
While a chilling effect is not necessary for unconstitutionality, the
concept of a "chilling effect" has become a vital substantive issue in first
amendment cases. 277 The chilling occurs when a person chooses not to
produce art that may violate "standards of decency," but not obscenity,
for fear of not receiving federal funding. 278 Artists receiving NEA grants
will be forced to produce "safe art" because they lack direction in deter-
mining what art may be deemed obscene. The pressure to create "safe
art" is magnified when one considers the dominant position that the
NEA occupies in the financial affairs of the United States art world.
279
271. See CONG. REC., supra note 251, and accompanying text.
272. Alan Parachini, Changed NEA Likely Even Without Content Rules, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 29,
1990, at F6.
273. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (quoting Cramp v. Board of
Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)); see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518-20
(1948) (does not use the term "chilling effect," but describes the potential harm causes by a vague
and overbroad statute).
274. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
275. Id. at 526.
276. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); see also Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction,
368 U.S. 278 (1961).
277. Schauer, supra note 179, at 685.
278. "It is of course unlikely that Ulysses will again be banned, but there is a danger under the
new (Miller) test that a second-rate Ulysses which the Court does not regard as sufficiently 'serious'
will be." HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 50 (1988); see United States v. One Book
Entitled "Ulysses", 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
279. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 785 (S.D. Cal. 1991).
['Vol. 67:1107
1991 NEA APPROPRIATIONS ACT
The production of "safe art" is in effect self-censorship. 280
Nevertheless, before the Supreme Court will find a vague regulation
unconstitutional, it requires that the restriction punish the unpunish-
able,28 1 and it will permit a free speech challenge based exclusively on
vagueness if the "law reaches 'a substantial amount of Constitutionally
protected conduct.' "282 The rationales for voiding the law are: 1) the
importance of avoiding the chilling effect on expression;283 2) the assur-
ance that those responsible for enforcing the restriction are provided with
objective standards that will avoid the weaknesses associated with the
arbitrary exercise of discretionary power;284 and 3) the guarantee that
those acting within protected speech are guarded from the
government. 28
5
It is paramount that artists are free to produce art free of the bur-
dens associated with vagueness; therefore vague restrictions should be
facially struck down. From the assumption that individuals will usually
attempt to minimize risks as much as possible,286 one can deduce that
people will not undertake an activity that the legislature has surrounded
by an ambiguous statute, unless they are confident that they will be free
from its reach.287 The Court and commentators have characterized these
types of restrictions as having a "chilling effect ' 288 on free expression.
The "chilling" of an activity occurs anytime a regulation deters a person
from an activity which the first amendment protects.28 9
The importance of objective standards is highlighted where all of the
decision-making power is allotted to one person. All final decisions re-
garding the approval of the grant application are made by the NEA
Chairman, John Frohnmeyer. Although he is a product of the art com-
280. Senator Yates explained that experimental and "challenging" works "will be subject to very
close scrutiny under the terms of that clause." Kim Masters, Congress Approves Arts Funding Com-
promise, WASH. PosT, Oct. 28, 1990 at A17.
281. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1959).
282. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983) (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)).
283. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 797 (1984).
284. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
285. Id.
286. Schauer, supra note 179, at 685.
287. See id.
288. The term "chill" as used in the first amendment context has been traced to Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), where Justice Frankfurter noted
the inhibiting effect the loyalty oath requirements can have on teachers. Schauer, supra note 179, at
685 n. 1. Within fifteen years, chilling effect claims had become "ubiquitous." Zwicker v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241, 256 n.2 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (cited in Schauer, supra note 179, at 685 n.2).
289. Schauer, supra note 179. Broadly defined, chilling can occur as a result of any statute, civil,
criminal, or regulation. Id. at 689 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); Gibson v.
Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1963)).
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munity and respected among both grant recipients and Congress, the
next chairperson may not be as competent to make ad hoc decisions re-
garding "decency" as Frohnmayer. With one person having substantial
power the chances of arbitrary decisions are augmented. Vague congres-
sional regulations also result in a lack of warning to the artists about
which art is acceptable for NEA funding. This vague warning causes
arbitrary enforcement because it leaves even the decision-makers
confused.
Therefore, the decency requirement is unconstitutional because it is
a vague infringement upon a protected form of speech. However, an in-
quiry concerning the constitutionality of the decency requirement must
consider whether the NEA may premise the receipt of a benefit on an
infringement of a constitutional right.290
IV. CONDITIONS
29 1
The federal government's powers are seen as plenary.292 Thus, it
may only do what is specifically prescribed in the Constitution. Since the
Constitution does not specifically give Congress the power to support the
arts, 2 9 3 one can only assume that the NEA has been justified under the
Spending Power. 294 Under this power, Congress has repeatedly attached
conditions to the receipt of federal funds to further "the federal interest
in particular national projects or programs. '295
However, the Spending Power is limited by four separate limita-
tions: the expenditure must be for the general welfare, 296 the conditions
imposed may not be ambiguous, 297 they must be reasonably related to the
purpose of the expenditure, 298 and the legislation may not violate any
290. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1422-25
(1989).
291. While unconstitutional conditions has recently become an issue in the area of abortion, I
believe that the law surrounding abortion is essentially sui generis and, as much as I would relish
discussing my views on the issue, any discussion of abortion is unfortunately beyond the scope of this
Note.
292. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
293. It has been suggested that the only Constitutional confirmation for Congressional support
of the arts was the one authorizing Congress to provide for a seat of government. BANFIELD, supra
note 54, at 40.
294. The Constitution empowers Congress to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Ex-
cises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
295. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978). See Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U.S.
127 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
296. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937).
297. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
298. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. at 461.
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independent constitutional prohibition. 299 Congress has repeatedly used
the power "to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of
federal monies upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory
and administrative directives. ' 300 However, the Court has stressed that
the government may not do indirectly what it cannot directly do. 30 1 Fur-
ther, the Court has stated that the government may not impose an un-
constitutional condition on the exercise of a fundamental right. 302
However, a practice of not subsidizing the exercise of a fundamental
right is different from a complete ban on the exercise of a fundamental
right 30 3 or from the encumbrance of an unconstitutional condition on the
exercise of a fundamental right. 30 4 When the American aspiration to en-
courage free speech conflicts with a governmental goal, the regulation of
conduct will be considered acceptable where the regulation is constitu-
tional and does not aim at suppressing political speech.3 05
However, the Court recognizes that "there are some purported in-
terests - such as a desire to suppress support for a minority party or an
unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points of view
from the marketplace of ideas-that are so plainly illegitimate" that even
a "significant and legitimate state interest"3 06 cannot outweigh the right
to free speech. When the restriction is based on the content of the
speech, the Court will view it as unconstitutional because of "the need
for absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of communica-
tion may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view
being expressed by the communicator. ' 307 Thus, a regulation is uncon-
299. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985).
300. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980); Massachusetts v. United States, 435
U.S. 444 (1978); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947);
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Commentators have frequently and rigidly
fought this view. See Sullivan, supra note 290, at 1418; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme
Court, 1987 term-Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitu-
tion, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Nega-
tive Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Murphy, supra note 9.
301. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Speiser v. Randell, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958).
302. E.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (government may not deny a benefit for
reasons that infringe the beneficiary's interest in freedom of speech).
303. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
304. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); see also Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94 (1976); Planned Parenthood v.
Agency for Int'l Dev., 915 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1990).
305. Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (regulation allowed as long as it
furthers an important interest that is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression").
306. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). See
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
307. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976).
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stitutional if it infringes upon a protected class' free speech, singles out a
certain idea or message, or seeks to control speech based on content.30 8
Thus, though art has a "preferred" place in society, 30 9 the government
may suppress it so long as the provisions are constitutional and the Con-
gressional aim is not directed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.
Congress' purpose in formulating the restrictions in the 1991 NEA
Appropriations Bill was not the suppression of dangerous ideas. The de-
cency provision is merely a congressional attempt to ensure that artists
use the funds in a manner that taxpayers would approve. 310 However,
the provision itself is unconstitutional because it is an infringement on
constitutionally protected nonobscene speech and it is so vague that one
would have to guess about its intended meaning. Thus, the government
may put restrictions on who and how it subsidizes as long as it does not
do so in a manner that is vague and violates the first amendment. 311 This
Note does not state that the government could not place clear and con-
cise restrictions on the ability of the NEA to fund obscene art. However,
the vague manner that Congress has chosen to infringe upon protected
speech is unconstitutional.
One may argue that the decency requirement does not force artists
to make a decision between the subsidy and free speech. This, however,
is not true. Realistically, the NEA has a substantial and influential role
in the funding of all art. 312 Its decision to fund a project lends such credi-
bility to an undertaking that matching grants are easily obtained. 313
Therefore, without the support of the NEA, an artist could not receive
private or public funding for an undertaking. 314 "This is the type of ob-
stacle in the path of the exercise of fundamental speech rights that the
constitution will not tolerate. '
31 5
Some may argue that the NEA decency restriction is de minimis
because it will affect only a limited number of artists. However, when it
is applied, it imposes a harsh punishment on recipients who wish to pro-
duce art that does not ultimately conform to the decency requirement.
The general response to this argument is that if artists wish to produce
indecent art then they can always fund their own art projects. Yet, the
308. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804.
309. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973).
310. 136 CONG. REC., supra note 251, at S16,635. The main thrust of the NEA funding restric-
tions is the repayment of funds used for any art found obscene by the courts. Id.
311. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972).
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sanction is exceedingly harsh considering that artists often do not have
the money to fund their projects. Therefore, the condition is anything
but de minimis.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 1991 NEA AMENDMENT
In passing the Amendment, Congress was attempting to appease the
right wing, which was placing pressure on Congress to control the fund-
ing of obscene art.316 Members of the 101st Congress walked a fine line
between the fundamentalist right and the Constitution. The "lobbying"
executed by the fundamentalists is legal. Every citizen or taxpayer has
the right to be heard by Congress, especially where a dispute involves an
organization that is funded with taxpayer dollars. Also, Congress has
the power and the right to prevent the funding of obscene art because
obscenity is not a form of protected speech. 31 7 However, by prohibiting
the funding of art that violates "standards of decency," Congress has
overstepped its authority by treating sexually indecent artistic speech dif-
ferently from other types of art.
Congress should have realized that "[s]ome degree of abuse is insep-
arable from the proper use of everything .... [I]t is better to leave a few
noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away,
to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits. ' 318 The first option
available to Congress is not to fund the arts at all. It is possible for the
wealthy in this country to support the arts. Still, it is irrational to believe
that individuals can or will sustain the arts at their current funding
levels. There is little evidence that the 1990s foster a better atmosphere
for charitable contributions than did the 1960s. During the 1960s, when
the costs associated with the production of the arts were considerably
less, private donations were insufficient. It is unrealistic to believe that
without government funding, the arts in the United States can be sus-
tained at a sufficient level.
Another option for Congress would be to directly cease funding the
NEA, while allowing a dollar-for-dollar tax incentive, up to a specified
limit, for contributions to the arts. Congress could set a limit on the
maximum allowable contribution based on its computation of the
amount of taxes needed. If this plan were adopted, Congress would not
316. See supra note 3.
317. See supra notes 99-188 and accompanying text.
318. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) (quoting JAMES MADISON, Report on the
Virginia Resolutions, in 4 LETTERS AND O)THER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 515, 544 (New
York, Worthington 1884)).
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save any money, but the purpose of this alternative is not to save Con-
gress from spending.
This alternative is facially appealing because individuals can then
decide for themselves what type of art they wish to fund. The process
also seems more democratic. For example, those people who do not
want to fund experimental art do not have to finance experimental art.
Similarly, those people who do not wish to fund a Brahms recital do not
have to "spend" their money on a donation. However, society would be
moving back to the early 1960s when support for the arts was insuffi-
cient. These options are not practical because it is difficult to imagine the
private sector voluntarily maintaining the arts to the same extent as the
NEA supports them.
Another less drastic alternative would be to invoke constitutional
restrictions on the receipt of art funding. First, retain the obscenity re-
payment requirement with its imperfections. If a court later finds the art
obscene, then it only seems fair that the artist should be forced to repay
the amount of funding back to the NEA. The government should not be
subsidizing obscene art. This would also accommodate political interests
by placating fundamentalists and soothing the brow of the art commu-
nity. However, the decency provision is unconstitutional and should be
removed.
Another feasible alternative would be to retain the prior restrictions
on art funding, while construing this restriction narrowly and definitely
enough so that no constitutional problems will arise when the law is chal-
lenged. The decision-making process should be in the hands of a small
committee, perhaps made up of seven or nine people, instead of vested
entirely in one person. This committee should be made up of recognized
artists and anyone with a serious interest in the arts.
CONCLUSION
Funding for the NEA has given many the opportunity to voice their
opinions concerning the extent to which their tax dollars support govern-
mental programs. They may be rebelling against art that they find
graphic, shocking, and outright revolting; however, the art that the de-
cency requirement affects is not necessarily legally obscene and is, there-
fore, protected by the first amendment. As protected speech, Congress
cannot treat it unlike any other form of art, without abridging the first
amendment.
The 1991 NEA Amendment tests constitutional doctrine in a myr-
iad of anticipated (the difference between indecent and obscene speech)
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and unexpected ways-the relationship between content-neutral and con-
tent-based, the distinction between profane indecent speech and sexual
obscene speech, and the commitment to clearly written legislation. It is
possible, however, to draft such legislation within the confines of conven-
tional doctrines. Nonobscene artistic sexual speech is entitled to the full
protection of the first amendment. Therefore, the NEA should fund it in
the same way it funds all other art. This conclusion can be attained with-
out compromising other well-accepted doctrines.
Congress should encourage important social benefits without posing
significant threats to a well-functioning system of free expression. In
both Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, people who have en-
dured censorship and oppression for decades are rising up and winning
new freedoms. 319 It is shameful that Congress must fail the test of liberty
by erecting new barriers against free expression. 320 Still, the judicial
branch has a duty to find the decency requirement void because it goes
against the constitution; for if free speech is not protected for the Map-
plethorpes of the world, then soon it will not be there for any of us.
319. 136 CONG. REC. S17,988 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
320. Id.
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